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INTRODUCTION
Burkina Faso’s rich civic institutions are rooted in the history of the pre-
colonial Mossi kingdoms, the traditions of stateless societies in the
southwest, the Islamic brotherhoods that structure the lives of Mus-
lims, the hundred-year presence of the Roman Catholic Church and
Protestant missionary societies, and popular struggles for representa-
tion during the colonial and postindependence periods. This heritage
is a constant feature of contemporary political discourse, with critics
accusing the current regime of betraying the country’s political tradi-
tions. The regime’s defenders emphasize its continuity with the past
and its efforts to restore civic life after the excesses of the revolutionary
period of the 1980s.
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capital: Ouagadougou
population: 14.8 million
gni per capita: $460
scores 2005 2007
accountability and public voice: 3.44 3.52
civil liberties: 3.88 4.21
rule of law: 3.32 3.45
anticorruption and transparency: 3.12 3.30
(scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest
and 7 representing strongest performance)
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In recent years, the government has taken a number of important
steps in the process of deepening participation in governance and the
protection of civil liberties. These have included peaceful and relatively
free presidential elections, municipal elections, the decentralization of
local governance through mayoral and council elections in rural com-
munes, and continued expansion of civil society institutions. The posi-
tive developments, however, have been accompanied by allegations 
of widespread corruption, clashes between police and the army in 
Ouagadougou, and the July 2006 dismissal of the criminal case against
a member of the Presidential Guard who was accused of killing a
prominent journalist in 1998.
Freedom and democracy in Burkina Faso have often been overshad-
owed by the personal rule of President Blaise Compaore. He and other
members of a revolutionary council seized control of the country in
1983, ending a succession of short-lived military governments that had
followed the 1980 ouster of longtime ruler General Sangoule Lamizana.
In the council, Compaore, Jean-Baptiste Lingani, and Henri Zongo
shared power with Captain Thomas Sankara, the extremely popular and
charismatic young president. Sankara soon consolidated his leadership
position, adopted a more strident and Marxist rhetoric for the regime,
and became heavily involved in foreign affairs as a “revolutionary” leader
of the Third World. In 1987, Compaore launched his own coup, dur-
ing which Sankara was assassinated. Lingani and Zongo were summar-
ily executed in 1989, allegedly for plotting against Compaore.
Compaore in 1991 began fresh efforts to legitimize his rule. Through
a new constitution, he institutionalized a process of gradual political lib-
eralization. Later that year, he won a seven-year term as president in an
election that was boycotted by opposition forces. The opposition had
called for a truly representative constituent assembly to draw up the new
constitution. Compaore was sworn in for a second term in 1998, after
an election that was again largely boycotted by the opposition. In the
period between 2000 and 2002, the constitution was amended to limit
the presidency to two five-year terms, an independent electoral com-
mission was created, and judicial reforms clarified the powers of the var-
ious appellate courts. The government was explicit in hoping for a strong
showing by opposition parties in the 2002 legislative elections, and in-
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deed, the combined opposition gained a substantial number of parlia-
mentary seats. Compaore ran for the presidency again in 2005, follow-
ing the expiration of his second seven-year term, arguing that the
constitutional term limits did not apply retroactively. Opposition forces
mounted and lost a legal challenge but decided not to boycott the elec-
tion. Compaore received 80 percent of the vote, and the process was
generally viewed as free, but not entirely fair due to the resource advan-
tage held by the incumbent.
While the past decade has seen gains in the construction of the for-
mal apparatus of freedom and democracy, they must be viewed through
the prism of the still-unresolved killing of journalist Norbert Zongo and
three traveling companions in 1998.1 Zongo, as editor of the newspaper
L’Independent, was a fierce critic of the government. His investigation
into a convoluted corruption, torture, and murder case that allegedly
involved the younger brother of the president, François Compaore, was
proving to be extremely damaging to the legitimacy of the regime.
Zongo’s death prompted opposition parties and human rights activists
to coalesce into what became known as the Collective Against Impunity,
a loose umbrella group led by magistrate and human rights advocate
Halidou Ouedraogo.2 The Collective has organized peaceful demon-
strations every year to mark the anniversary of the murders, and its
actions were probably largely responsible for the constitutional and ex-
ecutive branch reforms of 2000–2002.
The Collective also maintained pressure on the government to pur-
sue a judicial inquiry into the Zongo murders. In 2001, Compaore orga-
nized a National Day of Pardon for all illegal acts committed by his own
and earlier military regimes. Since 1998, security forces have by all
appearances been careful not repeat such crimes. Nevertheless, the unre-
solved murders of Zongo and his companions—combined with other
unpunished and undocumented extrajudicial killings, disappearances,
and alleged assassinations in the first decade of Compaore’s rule—have
raised concerns that many members of the president’s inner circle are
above the law and public accountability, and that the country’s demo-
cratic institutions and civil liberties are merely tools of convenience for
the leadership.
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC VOICE
Electoral politics in Burkina Faso appear to be at the cusp of the divide
between demoracy and authoritarianism. Suffrage is universal, and no
special interest groups have formally disproportionate representation in
government. Electoral reforms in 2002 led to a substantial opposition
presence in the National Assembly, 54 out of 111 seats. The introduc-
tion of a single-ballot format reduced the opportunities for buying votes,
and significant attention has been paid to regularizing the electoral rolls.
In addition, public financing for political parties has undoubtedly pro-
vided incentives for more political newcomers to enter the ring in pres-
idential and legislative elections.
Presidential elections in November 2005, municipal and communal
elections in April 2006, and other special elections during the 2004 to
2006 period were held in a largely competitive and peaceful environ-
ment. The presidential poll resulted in a landslide victory for Compaore,
who obtained slightly more than 80 percent of the vote. The remainder
was divided among twelve other candidates, none of whom received
more than 5 percent of the vote. A number of international observers
issued favorable reports about the election, but noted some irregulari-
ties and possible fraudulent activities, particularly the manipulation of
electoral rolls.3
Compaore has yet to indicate convincingly that he is willing to step
aside in a peaceful transition, dissuading potentially viable candidates
from entering the fray. He appears unlikely to surrender power without
some provision of immunity for himself and other senior officials with
respect to the violence committed by security forces since the 1983 coup.
The municipal and communal vote, which had been delayed twice
due to organizational difficulties, produced a low turnout of 49 percent
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free and fair electoral laws and elections: 2.50
effective and accountable government: 3.25
civic engagement and civic monitoring: 4.33
media independence and freedom of expression: 4.00
category average: 3.52
of the electorate.4 The president’s party, the Congress for Democracy
and Progress (CDP), won approximately 73 percent of the seats in com-
munal councils and close to 90 percent of mayoral posts across the coun-
try. While the outcome of the local elections was never in doubt, the act
of finally decentralizing political authority after years of discussion and
delay was a very positive development for Burkinabe democracy. In spe-
cial elections for the municipal council of Po, held in February 2007
after the previous council was dissolved by the Ministry of Territorial
Administration and Decentralization, the ruling party and the opposi-
tion each accused the other of buying votes with cash distributions.5
The CDP continues to dominate the political playing field. Many
Burkinabe perceive that it has become a powerful electoral machine,
much like the single-party systems of the 1970s, but now with the illu-
sion of multiparty competition. In much of the country, the well-
financed CDP is able to dominate elections without recourse to overt
fraud. The party enjoys multiple benefits of incumbency, including the
ability to attract considerable campaign donations and greater media
attention than its competitors. Opposition politicians believe themselves
to be generally threatened with violence should they come too close to
defeating the ruling party. A number of politicians issued a public state-
ment in 2005 asserting that they had been threatened by an unidenti-
fied Sierra Leonean.6 The opposition also refers to the case of lawmaker
Hermann Yameogo, the son of Burkina Faso’s first president, Maurice
Yameogo, who was detained at the Ouagadougou airport in September
2004 and accused of working with hostile foreign governments.
Support for the opposition weakened even further after several of its
candidates were accused of accepting funding from the president and the
CDP to organize parties that would help create the illusion of competi-
tion. During the presidential campaign of 2005, Laurent Bado, candidate
of the Opposition Burkinabe Unifiee (OBU), publicly admitted having
received thirty million CFA francs (US$6,200) from the president.7
Given the dominance of the CDP, opposition parties remain a last
recourse for aspiring public servants and often attract CDP members who
have lost favor within their own party. For example, in Bobo-Dioulasso,
the second-largest city and potentially a major base for any electoral chal-
lenge to the president,8 then-incumbent mayor Celestin Koussoube was
unceremoniously dropped from the CDP list as rumors circulated that
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he was a potential threat to the leadership in Ouagadougou. He promptly
switched parties, joining the Alliance for Democracy and the Federa-
tion, African Democratic Assembly (ADF-RDA), and was added to the
list for the district of Konsa in the municipal elections of 2005. The
high-profile switch prompted a rash of lower-level defections to and
from each side, although Koussoube lost his bid for mayor when the
new municipal council voted, 114 to 35, for Salia Sanou, a CDP stal-
wart and deputy in the National Assembly.9
Unlike national elections, communal elections seem to have genuine
competition and accountability, both within the CDP and among polit-
ical parties.10 In Boromo, in the province of Bales, for example, local res-
idents rejected CDP candidates selected by national party structures 
if they were deemed unresponsive to local needs, insisting instead on
better-known and more responsible local candidates. Factional splits in
the ruling party also allowed opposition candidates to be elected to the
Boromo council. In Gourcy, center of the province of Zondoma, sharp
rivalries within the CDP led to simultaneous party meetings held in dif-
ferent parts of the town, each seeking recognition from a delegation of
CDP leaders who came from Ouagadougou to resolve the problem.11
The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) organizes
and oversees elections. Appointments to the fifteen-member governing
board are divided, with five representatives chosen by the executive
branch, five by opposition parties, and five by civil society (one person
from each of three major religious communities, one from the institu-
tions of traditional chieftaincy, and one from the human rights commu-
nity). The method of selection is opaque, and the rushed and irregular
“election” of the human rights organizations’ representative in August
2006 drew much protest.12 Political parties are partially financed by the
state.13 The larger parties such as the CDP and ADF-RDA receive
amounts based on their electoral returns, and smaller parties have been
given equal shares of a remaining allocation. Annual grants to all parties
together have been approximately 200 million CFA francs (US$415,000).
There is little regulation of private financing of political parties.
A very small degree of rotation of power takes place within the elite
of the ruling party. The prime minister since 2000, Ernest Paramanga
Yonli, is among the longer-serving premiers of the Fourth Republic, as
the regime of President Compaore is known. While a large number of
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ministers and the head of the CDP are longtime stalwarts of the regime,
others are relative newcomers and technocrats.
Constitutionally, the National Assembly can hold the executive ac-
countable through votes of censure and no confidence, but in practice
it asserts little oversight and rarely questions government actions. In par-
ticular, the National Assembly has failed to establish commissions of in-
quiry to investigate any controversial government moves. Given the
dominance of the executive and legislature by one political party, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary is a matter of utmost importance. Reforms result-
ing from the Norbert Zongo crisis began the process of establishing a
stronger judiciary, but there is still little pretense of judicial independence.
The government seems to actively promote and empower minority
or historically disadvantaged social groups. For example, the government
annually organizes the Journee Nationale du Paysan (National Day of
the Farmer), an all-day affair at which government officials listen and
respond to the concerns of rural community leaders. The government
is also a strong promoter of artistic and cultural events. There are no ap-
parent restrictions on cultural expression, whether in traditional forms
(such as dance, masks, and oral poetry) or in new media of expression
(including print and recorded music and video).
Sankara’s rule in the 1980s created high popular expectations of ef-
fective and reasonably accountable governance, and the Compaore
regime has generally sought to meet those expectations. Meetings and
minutes of the Council of Ministers are regularly reported on and de-
bated in the press. Civil service positions are usually allocated by
national, competitive examinations, though allegations of irregular hir-
ing and promotion are a staple of daily newspapers. Technocrats are well
represented in the upper echelons of government. By and large, civic
associations are allowed to flourish. Those that seek formal status may
register with the government, and registration requirements are not
viewed as onerous.
International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate
throughout the country, and the activities of international human rights
groups and other civil liberties groups are not subject to any reported
impediments. The International Organization for Francophonie (OIF),
for example, organized a conference in September 2005 on sustainable
development, including themes of governance and human rights, that
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drew more than sixty international NGOs and local civil society orga-
nizations. In October 2006, the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
created a consultative committee to represent more than 100 civil soci-
ety organizations interested in working with the agency. There are few
barriers to the establishment of domestic NGOs, particularly for devel-
opment and associational activities. Farmer organizations, such as the
Cotton Producers Group (GPC) in the cotton areas, and the village
organizations known as Associations Naam–Six-S in the northwest, are
active in associational life. Many villages have development NGOs.
Political associations are also in evidence. An association of several
political parties called the Coordination for the Transparency of Elec-
tions (COTE) was formed in August 2005 to monitor the presidential
election.14 The Center for Democratic Governance regularly hosts con-
ferences and workshops and organizes research on the political institu-
tions of the country.
Article 8 of the constitution guarantees freedom of the press. The
country’s media outlets regularly report on the activities of the executive
branch, and open criticism of government action or inaction is common.
Several dozen newspapers are published regularly, including the sharply
satirical Journal de Jeudi. The government-funded official newspaper, 
Sidwaya, has been reasonably neutral in tone and coverage, including
during campaign seasons. The private sector has increased its presence in
television and radio, with three television stations and numerous private
radio stations broadcasting. The government television station, TNB, has
accepted funding from a number of major private enterprises and indi-
viduals, including the wealthy entrepreneurs Alizeta Ouedraogo (thirty
million CFA francs or US$62,300) and Oumarou Kanazoe (seventy mil-
lion CFA francs or US$145,500), for the remodeling of the station head-
quarters, but denied that this would influence news coverage.15
The media are free of overt censorship, and several newspapers are
openly antigovernment. However, the unpunished and unresolved mur-
ders of newspaper editor Norbert Zongo and his companions in 1998
have been considered by many to be a deliberate warning to journalists
to exercise self-censorship. A number of libel cases have further under-
scored the ambiguity of the government’s position regarding critical 
journalism. One case heard in January 2007 involved the bimonthly
newspaper L’Evenement, which published accusations made by the inter-
national organization Reporters Without Borders that the president’s
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brother had ordered Zongo’s killing.16 The defendants argued unsuccess-
fully that they were reporting the public accusations rather than the facts
of the matter; they were sentenced to two-month jail terms and fines of
300,000 CFA francs (US$623,200). Libel is considered a criminal offense
punishable by imprisonment rather than payment of monetary damages,
and there seems to be little interest in the CDP to change that status.17
Internet access is widely available in the two major cities of Ouaga-
dougou and Bobo-Dioulasso through an extensive array of private inter-
net cafes. The costs are affordable to middle-class users. A number of
websites (lefaso.net, for example) collate and archive articles from all 
of the major newspapers.
Recommendations
• The selection process for the governing board of the Independent
National Electoral Commission (CENI) should be reformed to im-
prove transparency and ensure that the outcome reflects the consensus
of the National Assembly.
• Compaore should complete the transition away from personal rule by
initiating an open discussion in the National Assembly on a grant of
immunity for acts of violence committed by security forces prior to
2000, and by organizing a process to select a new CDP leader who
could stand in the 2010 presidential election.
• Legislation should be enacted to regulate the financing of electoral
campaigns, with reporting requirements for party contributions as
well as provisions governing nonparty political campaigning.
• Penalties for libel should be reduced.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
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protection from state terror, unjustiﬁed imprisonment,
and torture: 3.00
gender equity: 3.75
rights of ethnic, religious, and other distinct groups: 4.50
freedom of conscience and belief: 6.00
freedom of association and assembly: 3.80
category average: 4.21
Overcrowded prisons and instances of arbitrary detention characterize
the justice system in Burkina Faso. One survey found that city and town
prisons were filled to double or even triple their intended capacity; an
estimated one-quarter of the inmates were awaiting trial.18 Burkinabe
citizens often note the prevalence of arbitrary arrest and the ease of un-
documented temporary detention despite laws providing formal pro-
tection against such abuses. Moreover, the popular opinion is that police
routinely beat and torture criminal suspects, although no reliable or
authoritative reports on the issue are currently available. The govern-
ment supports a citizen’s ombudsman, the Mediateur du Faso, whose
office works to facilitate the process of seeking redress for arbitrary
detention and other abuses against civil liberties.
There were no reports of torture or extrajudicial killings of political
opponents between November 2004 and March 2007. Noel Yameogo,
an official in the National Union for Democracy and Development
(UNDD) party, was arrested at Ouagadougou airport in September
2004—along with his cousin, Hermann Yameogo—and held for six
months without trial before he was released in February 2005.
Extrajudicial killings by police in rural areas continue to be a serious
problem. The killing of Djolgou Yaarga, a gold merchant, and his two
employees near the town of Piela in October 2006 illustrated the lack
of accountability among rural police services. Despite scant evidence,
the two employees were detained under suspicion of highway robbery
while traveling on a work assignment. Yaarga, learning of the arrest,
went to the jail to clarify the situation, but was also imprisoned. All three
men were executed the following day without a hearing or trial.
The government continued its effort to institutionalize a formal ap-
paratus for the protection of civil liberties. In 2002, it established the
Ministry for the Promotion of Human Rights and subsequently named
and continued to support Monique Ilboudo—a renowned lawyer, jour-
nalist, and defender of human rights—as human rights minister. The
government continued to honor its commitment, made during 
the National Day of Pardon, to indemnify the families of victims of
political violence. By the end of 2006, the families of 449 victims had
received compensation, and the total amount disbursed had reached 4.7
billion CFA francs (US$9.7 million).
A number of nongovernmental human rights organizations, includ-
ing the prominent Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP),
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continue to be active. The president of MBDHP, Halidou Ouedraogo,
suffered a heart attack in 2006 and was medically evacuated to France
for recovery and rehabilitation. In an interview after his return, he noted
that numerous government officials had assisted him in his recovery.19
The Burkinabe state has expressed considerable interest in protect-
ing the rights of minors, women, and socially distinct groups. Ilboudo,
the human rights minister, has been able to bring about the ratification
of a number of international protocols of high relevance to West Africa,
including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Optional
Protocol of the Convention Eliminating Discrimination Against
Women, and the Optional Protocol on the rights of women of the
Charter of the African Union.20 However, implementation of many of
the provisions of the protocols has been slow. In July 2005, a multilateral
cooperation agreement on child trafficking was adopted by a number of
West African states, including Burkina Faso. The signings and ratifica-
tions were accompanied by the establishment of programs to make cit-
izens and local authorities more aware of the problems and encourage
them to seek solutions, and the government has promised reforms of
the relevant national laws.21
Women have enjoyed increasing freedom from discrimination as the
customs and traditions of rural society erode. The government has
strongly backed efforts to improve the low rates of female school atten-
dance. Messages of empowerment, in newspapers, soap operas, radio
programs, and other formats, are encouraged, and the CDP tried in the
municipal elections of 2006 to increase gender equality in the party lists,
with the goal of a 25 percent female quota in urban areas and a 50 per-
cent quota of women candidates in rural areas. In early 2007, the gov-
ernment announced that it would support a 30 percent quota of women
in decision-making positions in the executive branch.
The state supports the livelihoods of people with disabilities by en-
couraging civil society organizations devoted to improving their well-
being. However, the circumstances of extreme poverty in Burkina Faso
make state support for the rights of the disabled more rhetorical than
effective. There has been little effort to make public buildings accessible
to those with special needs, and the private sector is not held to any mea-
sure of accountability for discrimination or physical accommodation.
The government hosted the Pan-African Disabled Games in July 2005.
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Religious and ethnic tolerance has long been a hallmark of Burkin-
abe society and state policy, and this continued through the survey
period.22 The constitution proscribes the formation of political parties
on the basis of religious affiliation or ethnic identity. Political advertising
designed to appeal to narrow religious or ethnic interests is prohibited.
There is little evidence of employment discrimination based on religion
and ethnicity.
The government and civil society organizations value the Burkinabe
tradition of parente a plaisanterie ( joking relationships) among ethnic
groups as a cultural mechanism for defusing possible ethnic tensions.
The government holds an annual Week of Culture festival and makes
every effort to include all the ethnic groups of the country. Religious
organizations abound in Burkina Faso, and there is considerable prose-
lytizing and conversion among Christian and Muslim groups, as well as
a substantial adherence to traditional religious practices. The govern-
ment in general does not interfere with religious practices.
Freedom of association is increasingly respected, and there were few
reported cases of police interruption of peaceful rallies or denial of demon-
stration permits during the survey period. Trade unions and civic associ-
ations are active in Burkina Faso. During much of 2005, the major unions
organized short national strikes as they negotiated with the government
over salaries and benefits. There has been little recent government inter-
ference in their activities. The long process of privatization begun in the
1990s has resulted in a much-smaller parastatal sector, and this has
reduced the ability of organized labor to effect government change.
Recommendations
• The National Assembly should hold hearings and work with the
Ministry for the Promotion of Human Rights to submit and make
public a report to the secretariat for the Convention Against Torture,
indicating the specific steps that have been taken to enforce the pro-
visions of the convention.
• The government should cease holding citizens in detention without
charge for longer than the prescribed seventy-two hours.
• Cases of extrajudicial killing, especially by police in rural areas where
there are few witnesses or checks on police power, should be exam-
ined by an independent prosecutor.
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• The National Assembly should organize public hearings and site vis-
its to assess prison conditions throughout the country.
RULE OF LAW
A prosecuting judge’s July 2006 decision to dismiss the case against the
sole suspect in the Norbert Zongo murders presented a serious setback
to the popular perception of judicial independence. The case documents
seemed to indicate very strong evidence of the guilt of defendant 
Marcel Kafando, a member of the Presidential Guard, causing wide-
spread public dissatisfaction when the case was dismissed. The prose-
cuting judge indicated that he had been unable to secure testimony from
many members of the Presidential Guard and that a key witness against
Kafando had recanted his testimony. However, many opposition figures
argued that the evidence was more than sufficient had the prosecutor
wanted to pursue the case vigorously.
Reforms resulting from the Zongo crisis began the process of estab-
lishing an independent judiciary, but there is still little pretense of judi-
cial independence. According to the constitution, the judiciary is
regulated by the High Council of Magistrates (CSM); the president of
the CSM is the president of the republic. The reelection of President
Compaore in 2005 was made possible in part by the preelection deci-
sion of the Constitutional Council, created in 2000, to reject the peti-
tion of four opposition presidential candidates who argued that
Compaore had already served the maximum number of terms. The coun-
cil found that the 2000 amendment limiting the presidency to two five-
year terms was not retroactive. Of the ten members of the Constitutional
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independent judiciary: 3.40
primacy of rule of law in civil and criminal matters: 3.33
accountability of security forces and military to 
civilian authorities: 2.50
protection of property rights: 4.00
equal treatment under the law: 4.00
category average: 3.45
Council, the president appoints seven (including the body’s president
and three magistrates nominated by the justice minister) and the head
of the National Assembly names three. All but the council’s president
serve nine-year terms, with one-third of the members subject to renewal
every three years.
The judicial reforms of 2000 led to the creation of a Supreme Court
with jurisdiction over the president in cases of treason, violation of the
constitution, or misappropriation of public funds. The Supreme Court
can hear an accusation only if it is referred with a vote by four-fifths of
the members of the National Assembly, which is extremely unlikely. The
members of the Supreme Court are selected from the National Assem-
bly and the Appeals Court, and as long as the CDP remains in control of
the executive and legislative branches, the Supreme Court will consist
of CDP and presidential loyalists.
The evolution of a truly independent judiciary made slow progress
between 2004 and 2007. Judicial independence was a central plank of
the government’s National Policy for Good Governance (PNBG), orig-
inally adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1998 and renewed in May
2006. The action plan for the PNBG document went through a partic-
ipatory formulation process after being drafted initially by the High
Authority for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption (HACLC),
the government anticorruption unit. For example, a two-day workshop
in Ouahigouya to discuss the document drew several hundred govern-
ment and civil society participants and generated open discussion and
suggestions for amendment.23 Nonetheless, corruption remains one of
the main problems in the Burkinabe judicial system. A 2005 report 
by the CSM found numerous instances of corruption in the national
courts of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
Judges in Burkina Faso are, given the circumstances, reasonably well-
trained to administer justice. Under a judicial reform program that com-
menced in 2002, the number and training of magistrates has been
increasing rapidly, and the government has embarked on a program to
build and equip the infrastructure of appeals courts and Courts of First
Instance (TGI).
Defendants are informally presumed guilty, despite legal provisions
guaranteeing the opposite, and often do not have access to legal repre-
sentation.
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It is very difficult to gauge the effectiveness of civilian control over
the military and police in Burkina Faso. A serious test of effective civil-
ian control occurred in December 2006, in what became known as l’af-
faire militaire-policier. The incident began when an army recruit was
shot dead by a police officer following an altercation. Infuriated, the re-
cruit’s army comrades raided a camp armory and proceeded to mount
attacks against police positions throughout central Ouagadougou. The
police responded with some small-arms fire but generally fled and re-
moved their uniforms. Military personnel set up roadblocks and, accord-
ing to some accounts, proceeded to confiscate the personal property of
civilians who entered the downtown area the next morning. Authority
over the military was not fully restored until the following afternoon. The
civilian defense minister appeared in public with the security minister,
who was in charge of the police, and reassured the public that the unrest
was under control. The government officially announced that the vio-
lence had caused six deaths.
Rumors that the events were really an attempted coup d’etat circu-
lated widely, as did assertions that the soldiers had attacked the main
prison of Ouagadougou and either deliberately or accidentally allowed
prisoners to escape. Moreover, it seemed that once soldiers saw that dis-
cipline was breaking down, they used the disorder as an opportunity to
vent dissatisfaction with living conditions and pay. In the days follow-
ing the violence, soldiers presented a list of demands to the authorities.
On the evening of December 31, troops opened fire in other major
towns in an apparent display of solidarity with the Ouagadougou sol-
diers. Prison guards attempted a mass strike in early January, claiming
the right to indemnification for losses suffered during the two days of
violence, as well as improvements in working conditions.24
The events point to ineffective mechanisms for communication and
response to grievances within the security forces, and suggest that there
is not yet full respect for the rule of law among younger recruits. Only a
full public analysis of the violence can help ensure that soldiers remain
in their barracks and police do not act with impunity. As of March
2007, neither the National Assembly nor the executive had indicated
any commitment to such an inquiry.
The reaction to the army-police clashes contrasted with the spirit
of open investigation and disclosure that animated a military tribunal
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convened in April 2004 to try a group of military officers and enlisted
men who had been charged in October 2003 with involvement in an
alleged coup plot.25 The defendants were accused of taking money to
carry out the coup and recruiting comrades within the military to sup-
port them. The trial was billed by the government as an example of the
institutionalization of the rule of law and a divergence from the sum-
mary executions of coup plotters both in neighboring countries and in
Burkina Faso in the past. Some of the accused were acquitted, and oth-
ers were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms. President Com-
paore subsequently freed some of the imprisoned officers as part of 
the National Day of Pardon. Nevertheless, when two of the freed men,
Bayoulou Bouledie and Bassama Bassole, sought out members of the
press in April 2006, claiming that they were being followed and feared
for their lives, they were detained for two days and then released without
charge.26 Commander Bernardin Pooda, another of the officers tried in
2004, was brought before a military tribunal again in early 2007 on
charges of embezzling public funds while serving in the military.27
Individual and corporate ownership of private property is increas-
ingly well respected. Contracts are generally enforced as part of the nor-
mal routine of governance. Labor contracts in particular are subject to
considerable scrutiny and enforcement by the Work Inspectorate, a gov-
ernment agency. The most significant public taking of private property
for redevelopment efforts, the Projet ZACA in central Ouagadougou,
proved in early 2007 to be less poorly managed than public perception
had hitherto held, as infrastructural improvements and land titling be-
gan in the project area. Decentralization policies have sped up the
process of formal surveying, subdivision, and titling of residential parcels
in larger villages and small towns. Agricultural, pastoral, and forested
areas held as traditional, communal, or common property continue
gradually to come under the umbrella of regularized and formal land-
use rules as part of the National Program for the Management of Rural
Lands (PNGT). The establishment of rural communes is likely to
strengthen this process further. Generally, compensation is rendered for
government takings.
Recommendations
• The High Council of Magistrates and the Constitutional Council
should be made completely independent of the executive, and the vot-
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ing margins for referring cases of presidential malfeasance to the Su-
preme Court should be lowered.
• A public parliamentary inquiry into the l’affaire militaire-policier
should be conducted, and reforms—such as a regular monthly dia-
logue and joint activities among the various security services—should
be implemented to ensure that the events are not repeated.
• The government should regularly publish the salaries and supple-
mental pay scales of magistrates as one in a series of steps to reinforce
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
ANTICORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY
Anticorruption rhetoric has been an important element of Burkinabe
political discourse since the Sankara period, when public integrity in
word and deed were given great salience. Burkinabe are quick to note
that when Sankara was killed in 1987, a public inquest into his assets
revealed only a guitar, his aging Renault, and a sizable book collection.
The long-serving military ruler Sangoule Lamizana was also revealed to
have benefited little from his presidency; an inquest held under the rev-
olutionary Sankara regime found his accounting of presidential funds
to be adequate.
However, there are few checks on corruption at the apex of public
power in Burkina Faso. The listings of assets of the president and other
members of government, as prescribed by Article 77 of the constitution,
appear to be irrelevant, as the Constitutional Council does not make
these listings available to the public. The prohibition on government of-
ficials benefiting from or participating in transactions involving the pub-
lic domain is commonly evaded in practice, due in part to the extended
family relationships of the Burkinabe elite. Little positive or negative
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environment to protect against corruption: 3.00
existence of laws and ethical standards between  
private and public sectors: 3.25
enforcement of anticorruption laws: 3.25
governmental transparency: 3.71
category average: 3.30
evidence of these practices is available to the public, however. In recent
years, President Compaore and other high officials have repeatedly been
accused of violating the tradition of modesty and integrity, but 
his appetite for large-scale corruption is either well concealed or well
moderated.28
On numerous occasions over the period between 2004 and 2007,
the president and prime minister have publicly proclaimed the impor-
tance of the integrity in public administration. The government ratified
the African Union Convention against Corruption in 2005 and the UN
Convention on Corruption in 2006. The Compaore regime has since
1991 followed an economic model of liberalization and privatization,
which often has the effect of reducing the scope for corrupt practices by
bureaucrats. The government does a fair job of making budget discus-
sions, bidding for publicly financed projects, and the allocation of pub-
lic expenditures transparent.
Nevertheless, corruption remains a significant though not insur-
mountable problem. Burkina Faso’s score on Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index was low in comparison with those
of many other African countries. The range of scores for 2005 (the first
year the country was given a score in the index) was 2.7 to 3.9, with an
average of 3.4, ranking the country 70 out of 158 countries, in the com-
pany of Ghana, Mexico, and Egypt. For 2006, the country scores ranged
from 2.8 to 3.6, and the average score ranked Burkina Faso 79 out of
163 countries, flanked by Senegal and Lesotho.
The respected anticorruption NGO National Anticorruption Net-
work (REN-LAC), which has regularly surveyed government and private-
sector employees on the issues of corruption, has found that the urban
elite perceives corruption as a serious problem, with only minor changes
from year to year.29 Typically, about half of the respondents indicate that
corruption is widespread, about three-quarters say that the problem is
worsening rather than improving, and one-third to one-half report that
they have personally had experiences with corruption. Corruption is
believed to be especially widespread in the customs and police services.
Education and the media are consistently viewed as the least corrupt
professional sectors.
The media report widely on cases of corruption, and the REN-LAC
reports contain summaries of the content of newspaper articles dealing
with corruption. One observation REN-LAC makes is that a large num-
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ber of articles are unsigned; the nature of corruption is such that hard
evidence is difficult to obtain and the actors involved are often powerful
public figures. Nevertheless, a number of journalists (Michel Zoungrana,
Lierme Some, and San Evariste Barro) and independent newspapers
(L’Observateur Paalga, L’Independent, and Le Pays) have strong reputa-
tions for regularly reporting on corruption.
Possibly the most significant action against corruption in 2005 was
the dismissal of Mathieu Ouedraogo, the minister of primary education
(Ministere de l’Enseignement de Base et de l’Alphabetisation), follow-
ing accusations that he had embezzled 700 million CFA francs (US$1.45
million). There was no official comment on his removal from office, and
he was subsequently named ambassador to South Africa. The lack of
follow-through in the form of a public inquiry or judicial process sug-
gested to many that the government was not serious about punishing
major corruption. Most observers continue to believe that government
officials at the highest levels will not be investigated or prosecuted for
alleged corruption. The government insists that corruption is taken seri-
ously and that no officials are above the law.
Important corruption cases or accusations have implicated public of-
ficials in major cities such as Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Koudougou,
and Ouahigouya. In two of these cities, mayors were removed follow-
ing administrative findings of malfeasance or negligence in admini-
stration; in others, lower-level officials were removed from office or
high-ranking officials were induced to respond more forthrightly to pub-
lic accusations of corruption.
A smaller but typical case reported by REN-LAC concerned the sec-
ondary school of the small town of Zorgho, where a French donor city
had agreed to build a science laboratory.30 The school official in charge,
François Kabore, was found to have embezzled a large fraction of the
donated funds and never completed the laboratory. After his election as
mayor, however, he was arrested and found guilty of fraud in the allo-
cation of residential parcels following the surveying of the town, and
was sentenced to prison. The Council of Ministers removed him from
office in January 2005. Other public officials have been implicated in
similar fraudulent sales of residential parcels allocated by the govern-
ment in newly surveyed zones.31
Major corruption makes front-page news, but petty corruption in gov-
ernment bureaucracies—by the semipublic cotton marketing companies,
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in schools, by customs agents, and at the revenue service—is also viewed
in the Burkinabe newspapers and in ordinary discourse as a troubling
low-level threat to the social fabric. Cotton farmers see the semipublic
cotton companies as major venues of corruption. In an attempt to
increase competition and reduce corruption in the sector, the monop-
oly company SOFITEX was partially broken apart into regional public-
private entities in 2004. But the companies retain their local monopolies
over the sale of fertilizer and pesticides, and over the grading of cotton
quality and subsequent purchases from farmers. At numerous points in
the supply and marketing chain, cotton company employees have op-
portunities to extract bribes from farmers.32
Another area of concern is brand fraud, in which low-quality goods
are sold with the tag of a high-quality product attached. This type of
fraud has been found in consumer durables such as the ubiquitous
mobilette (moped) that the majority of the urban population uses for
motorized transport, as well as in pesticides and construction materials.
In 2005, the National Assembly undertook an inquiry into the quality
of mass-produced foodstuffs, and the resulting report identified numer-
ous irregularities. This was one of the few instances in which the legis-
lature took up the corruption issue.
Over the past decade the government has been steadily privatizing
many areas of the economy, including health and education, leading to
the rapid growth of private clinics and schools. The overall incidence of
abuse of public office may be declining as the private sector provides
more services to the public.
Several entities in the executive branch are responsible for combat-
ing corruption. There are inspection services tasked with auditing pub-
lic accounts and investigating corruption and fraud. Revenue-collection
and human-resource divisions of government are particularly prone to
corruption, and the leadership has devoted considerable resources to im-
proving the auditing and control capacities of these services, but such
capacities remain limited.
Three higher-level entities—the National Ethics Committee (CNE),
the High Authority for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption
(HACLC), and the Public Accounts Court—were established with much
fanfare in the aftermath of the Norbert Zongo crisis. They have, how-
ever, been allowed to lapse into a low level of effectiveness. The resources
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allocated for their activities have remained limited, and they are seen
essentially as reporting and coordinating bodies; that is, they are con-
sidered a part of the government rather than outside or independent
entities.
The nine-member CNE, the government ethics watchdog, was sup-
posed to be the highest-profile entity created. However, the committee
has had a rather limited impact. Only two annual reports (for 2002 and
2003) have been delivered to the prime minister, and although they were
made available to the public, little effort or resources were directed to
printing and distributing copies. The first report severely criticized and
called for reform of the inspection services. One recommendation was
for the government to publicize the services’ reports. The government’s
response, cited in the second CNE report, was that releasing inspection-
service reports would violate the separation of powers, according to
which the judicial system is responsible for prosecuting corrupt actions
by public officials. There is always a balance in any system of governance
between the public release of information in advance of a judicial process
and the presumption of innocence for individuals who might be named
in a government report. However, the government’s position, that the
results of all inquiries should be withheld, essentially tipped the balance
entirely to one side.
Reports and recommendations were also produced by the HACLC,
a government anticorruption body that began functioning in 2003. It
acts as a coordination unit within the government for public informa-
tion and administrative action, and manages a hotline service for citi-
zens to report corruption and request assistance. In presenting the
agency’s 2004 annual report, Honore Tougouri, then the president of
the HACLC, observed that it had not received a response to the recom-
mendations in the 2003 report. During HACLC workshops in Decem-
ber 2004 and December 2005, attendees made proposals to give the
entity some independent prosecutorial powers. Presenting the 2005 re-
port in March 2006, Tougouri repeated calls for greater coordination
and investigatory authority. He stepped down in 2006, and new
HACLC members were sworn in. They had not yet announced a report
for 2006 as of early 2007, nor had any of the reports been made fully pub-
lic. The government did adopt in May 2006 a National Plan of Action
against Corruption, as recommended by the HACLC, and Compaore gave
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the agency his support in his campaign statement for the 2005 election.33
The plan of action called for a number of reforms, but the government
has not yet passed legislation to adopt the proposed changes.
Finally, the Public Accounts Court (Cour des Comptes) was tasked
in the judicial reforms of 2000 to 2002 with oversight of public finances,
enhancing the normal investigations of the inspection services. Through
2005, the court had not yet issued any formal public reports on its inves-
tigations. The press indicated that the court had distributed reports to
members of the National Assembly, but no details were published on
the content of those reports. In October 2006, the Council of Minis-
ters adopted new rules that gave the court more autonomy and strength-
ened the career paths of the magistrates.
The plethora of bureaucratic anticorruption structures has led ob-
servers in the opposition and civil society to suggest that the grand strat-
egy of the regime is to buy off critics and incorporate them into public
service. These critics are promised much authority and independence
but then receive small budgets and have their reports ignored.
The right of citizens to obtain information about government oper-
ations in a timely and reasonable manner remains limited, and the gov-
ernment has not adopted freedom of information legislation. The
government made an initial investment in e-governance, creating web-
sites for many of the major ministries, but the sites have not been main-
tained, and access to documents and reports is limited. The government
does not make analyses of annual expenditures and receipts widely avail-
able. Information for people with disabilities is very limited, although
government investment in radio and television services increasingly pro-
vides visually impaired persons with access to information.
Recommendations
• Article 77 of the constitution should be revised to include public ac-
cess to the listings of assets submitted by members of the government.
• Reports and inquiries of the National Ethics Committee, the High
Authority for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption, the In-
spector General’s Office, and the Public Accounts Court should, as a
matter of policy, be made available to the public, either without de-
lay or after some fixed period following their finalization or presenta-
tion to the Council of Ministers.
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• A special prosecuting unit should be established to handle cases of
corruption by high government officials, and it should make public
at the end of every year a summary of investigations under way and
prosecutions brought against government officials.
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